Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Emergency Cooperation of Coal Mines

The behavior game model of multi-agent cooperation in the emergency rescue of the coal mine was constructed by using the evolutionary game theory and the numerical simulation method and introducing the rescue earnings of the emergency cooperation, the increment of the rescue earnings, the distribution coefficient of the earning increment, and the benefit factors such as the liquidated damages, opportunistic gains and upfront costs. Through the analysis of the influence of each benefit factor on the possibility of the coal enterprise reaching the emergency cooperation, the strategy selection of the cooperation among different enterprises was discussed. It was found in research that if the net opportunistic gains of two enterprises from non-cooperation were all greater than the net earnings of the additional rescue from the cooperation, the game results of both sides tented to non-cooperation, on the contrary, both sides tented to cooperation; the cooperation selection probability among coal enterprises presented a positive correlation with the increment of the rescue earnings, the reasonable allocation of the distribution coefficient of the earning increment and the liquidated damages, and a negative correlation with the early cooperation costs and the opportunistic gains.