Game research on unsafe behavior of operators in limited space under dynamic overflow reward and punishment mechanism

In order to effectively restrain the unsafe behavior of operators in limited space, this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of operators and managers in limited space from the perspective of bounded rationality. The evolution process of main strategies under different reward and punishment mechanisms was explored. On this basis, the influence of different parameter changes on the system evolution trajectory was analyzed through numerical simulation.It is found that when managers adopt the overflow effect reward and punishment mechanism, there is no stable strategy combination. The dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can achieve an evolutionary stable state. The management effect of the dynamic overflow reward and punishment mechanism is better than that of the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. Safety behavior of managers and operators is negatively correlated with safety input cost, and positively correlated with reward and punishment upper limits and government punishment. The research results put forward suggestions and measures for safety management in limited space operation from three aspects: reducing the input cost of safety management, improving the reward and punishment mechanism of safety management and strengthening the third-party supervision.