Abstract: In view of the impact of miners' unsafe emotional state on safety production, evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods were used to introduce factors such as cost, reward, potential risk perception, practitioners' reputation evaluation of safety inspectors and safety supervision value, and to build an evolutionary game model of "practitioners-safety inspectors-coal mine enterprises". Through the analysis of the influence of each impact factor on the possibility of three-party strategy choice, the influence relationship of the strategy choice of cooperation between enterprises was discussed. The results show that the miners' strategy choice has a positive correlation with personal risk perception ability, and a negative correlation with the complaint cost. The selection of security inspectors' strategies is greatly affected by the evaluation constraints of practitioners, the probability of security inspectors' strategy selection is negatively correlated with the benefits lost by practitioners' negative evaluations, and is positively correlated with the personal value and safety supervision value brought by positive evaluations. The cost of enterprise security input is negatively correlated with the stability of strategy evolution.